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Motivated by the fact that the same social dilemma can be perceived differently by different players, we here
study evolutionary multigames in structured populations. While the core game is the weak prisoner’s dilemma,
a fraction of the population adopts either a positive or a negative value of the sucker’s payoff, thus playing either
the traditional prisoner’s dilemma or the snowdrift game. We show that the higher the fraction of the population
adopting a different payoff matrix, the more the evolution of cooperation is promoted. The microscopic mecha-
nism responsible for this outcome is unique to structured populations, and it is due to the payoff heterogeneity,
which spontaneously introduces strong cooperative leaders that give rise to an asymmetric strategy imitation
flow in favor of cooperation. We demonstrate that the reported evolutionary outcomes are robust against varia-
tions of the interaction network, and they also remain valid if players are allowed to vary which game they play
over time. These results corroborate existing evidence in favor of heterogeneity-enhanced network reciprocity,
and they reveal how different perceptions of social dilemmas may contribute to their resolution.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Ge, 87.23.Kg
I. INTRODUCTION
Social dilemmas are situations in which individuals are torn
between what is best for them and what is best for the soci-
ety. If selfishness prevails, the pursuit of short-term individ-
ual benefits may quickly result in loss of mutually reward-
ing cooperative behavior and ultimately in the tragedy of the
commons [1]. Evolutionary game theory [2–6] is the most
commonly adopted theoretical framework for the study of so-
cial dilemmas, and none has received as much attention as the
prisoner’s dilemma game [7–24]. Each instance of the game
is contested by two players who have to decide simultane-
ously whether they want to cooperate or defect. The dilemma
is given by the fact that although mutual cooperation yields
the highest collective payoff, a defector will do better if the
opponent decides to cooperate.
Since widespread cooperation in nature is one of the most
important challenges to Darwin’s theory of evolution and nat-
ural selection, ample research has been devoted to the iden-
tification of mechanisms that may lead to a cooperative res-
olution of social dilemmas. Classic examples reviewed in
[25] include kin selection [26], direct and indirect reciprocity
[27, 28], network reciprocity [29], as well as group selec-
tion [30]. Recently, however, interdisciplinary research link-
ing together knowledge from biology and sociology as well
as mathematics and physics has revealed many refinements to
these mechanisms and also new ways by means of which the
successful evolution of cooperation amongst selfish and unre-
lated individuals can be understood [31–37].
One of the more recent and very promising developments
in evolutionary game theory is the introduction of so-called
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multigames [38, 39] or mixed games [40] (for earlier concep-
tually related work see [41]), where different players in the
population adopt different payoff matrices. Indeed, it is of-
ten the case that a particular dilemma is perceived differently
by different players, and this is properly taken into account
by considering a multigame environment. A simple example
to illustrate the point entails two drivers meeting in a narrow
street and needing to avoid collision. However, while the first
driver drives a cheap old car, the second driver drives a brand
new expensive car. Obviously, the second driver will be more
keen on averting a collision. Several other examples could be
given to illustrate that, when we face a conflict, we are likely
to perceive differently what we might loose in case the other
player chooses to defect. The key question then is, how the
presence of different payoff matrices, motivated by the dif-
ferent perception of a dilemma situation, will influence the
cooperation level in the whole population?
Multigames were thus far studied in well-mixed systems,
but since stable solutions in structured populations can dif-
fer significantly – a prominent example of this fact being the
successful evolution of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma
game through network reciprocity [29] – it is of interest to
study multigames also within this more realistic setup. In-
deed, interactions among players are frequently not random
and best described by a well-mixed model, but rather they are
limited to a set of other players in the population and as such
are best described by a network [31, 32, 34, 36, 42]. With this
as motivation, we here study evolutionary multigames on the
square lattice and scale-free networks, where the core game
is the weak prisoner’s dilemma while at the same time some
fraction of players adopts either a positive or a negative value
of the sucker’s payoff. Effectively, we thus have some play-
ers using the weak prisoner’s dilemma payoff matrix, some
using the traditional prisoner’s dilemma payoff matrix, and
also some using the snowdrift game payoff matrix. Within
this multigame environment, we will show that the higher
2the heterogeneity of the population in terms of the adopted
payoff matrices, the more the evolution of cooperation is pro-
moted. Furthermore, we will elaborate on the responsible mi-
croscopic mechanisms, and we will also test the robustness
of our observations. Taken together, we will provide firm
evidence in support of heterogeneity-enhanced network reci-
procity and show how different perceptions of social dilem-
mas contribute to their resolution. First, however, we proceed
with presenting the details of the mathematical model.
II. EVOLUTIONARY MULTIGAMES
We study evolutionary multigames on the square lattice and
the Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network [43], each with an av-
erage degree k = 4 and size N . These graphs, being homo-
geneous and strongly heterogeneous, represent two extremes
of possible interaction topology. Each player is initially des-
ignated either as cooperator (C) or defector (D) with equal
probability. Moreover, each instance of the game involves
a pairwise interaction where mutual cooperation yields the
reward R, mutual defection leads to punishment P , and the
mixed choice gives the cooperator the sucker’s payoff S and
the defector the temptation T . The core game is the weak pris-
oner’s dilemma, such that T > 1, R = 1 and P = S = 0. A
fraction ρ of the population, however, uses different S values
to take into account the different perception of the same social
dilemma. In particular, one half of the randomly chosen ρN
players uses S = +∆, while the other half uses S = −∆,
where 0 < ∆ < 1. We adopt the equal division of positive
and negativeS values to ensure that the average over all payoff
matrices returns the core weak prisoner’s dilemma, which is
convenient for comparisons with the baseline case. Primarily,
we consider multigames where, once assigned, players do not
change their payoff matrices, but we also verify the robustness
of our results by considering multigames with time-varying
matrices.
We simulate the evolutionary process in accordance with
the standard Monte Carlo simulation procedure comprising
the following elementary steps. First, according to the ran-
dom sequential update protocol, a randomly selected player x
acquires its payoff Πx by playing the game with all its neigh-
bors. Next, player x randomly chooses one neighbor y, who
then also acquires its payoff Πy in the same way as previously
player x. Importantly, at each instance of the game the applied
payoff matrix is that of the randomly chosen player who col-
lects the payoffs, which may result in an asymmetric payoff
allocation depending on who is central. This fact, however,
is key to the main assumption that different players perceive
the same situation differently. Once both players acquire their
payoffs, then player x adopts the strategy sy from player y
with a probability determined by the Fermi function
W (sy → sx) =
1
1 + exp[(Πx −Πy)/K]
, (1)
where K = 0.1 quantifies the uncertainty related to the strat-
egy adoption process [31, 44]. In agreement with previous
works, the selected value ensures that strategies of better-
performing players are readily adopted by their neighbors, al-
though adopting the strategy of a player that performs worse
is also possible [45, 46]. This accounts for imperfect infor-
mation, errors in the evaluation of the opponent, and similar
unpredictable factors.
Each full Monte Carlo step (MCS) consists of N elemen-
tary steps described above, which are repeated consecutively,
thus giving a chance to every player to change its strategy
once on average. All simulation results are obtained on net-
works typically with N = 104 players, but larger system size
is necessary on the proximity to phase transition points, and
the fraction of cooperators fC is determined in the stationary
state after a sufficiently long relaxation lasting up to 2 · 105
MCS. To further improve accuracy, the final results are av-
eraged over 200 independent realizations, including the gen-
eration of the scale-free networks, at each set of parameter
values.
III. RESULTS
Before turning to the main results obtained in structured
populations, we first briefly summarize the evolutionary out-
comes in well-mixed populations. Although the subpopula-
tion adopting the T > 1, R = 1, P = 0 and S = +∆
parametrization fulfills T > R > S > P , and thus in princi-
ple plays the snowdrift game where the equilibrium is a mixed
C + D phase, cooperators in the studied multigame actu-
ally never survive. Since there are also players who adopt
either the weak (T > R > P = S) or the traditional
(T > R > P > S) prisoner’s dilemma payoff matrix, the
asymmetry in the interactions renders cooperation evolution-
ary unstable. In fact, in well-mixed populations the base-
line case given by the average over all payoff matrices is re-
covered, which in our setup is the weak prisoner’s dilemma,
where for all T > 1 cooperators are unable to survive. More
precisely, cooperators using S = −∆ die out first, followed
by those using S = 0 and S = +∆, and this ranking is pre-
served even if the subpopulation using S = 0 is initially sig-
nificantly larger than the other two subpopulations (at small ρ
values). Although in finite well-mixed populations the rank of
this extinction pattern could be very tight, it does not change
the final fate of the population to arrive at complete defection.
In structured populations, as expected from previous ex-
perience [31, 32, 34, 36, 42], we can observe different so-
lutions, where cooperators can coexist with defectors over a
wide range of parameter values. But more importantly, the
multigame environment, depending on ρ and ∆, can elevate
the stationary cooperation level significantly beyond that war-
ranted by network reciprocity alone. We first demonstrate this
in Fig. 1(a), where we plot the fraction of cooperators fC as
a function of the temptation value T , as obtained for ρ = 1
and by using different values of ∆. It can be observed that
the larger the value of ∆ the larger the value of T at which
cooperators are still able to survive. Indeed, for ∆ = 0.8 co-
operation prevails across the whole interval of T . Since some
players use a negative value of S, it is nevertheless of interest
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Evolution of cooperation (top panel) and the
average payoff of the population (bottom panel) in the multigame en-
vironment on the square lattice. Depicted results were obtained for
ρ = 1 and different values of ∆, as indicated in the legend. Here
ρ = 1 means that all players use either S = +∆ or S = −∆ (none
use S = 0). Larger values of∆ allow cooperators to survive at larger
values of T . Importantly, this improvement in fC is also accompa-
nied by a suitable increase in the average payoff of the population, as
shown in the bottom panel.
to test whether the elevated level of cooperation actually trans-
lates to a larger average payoff of the population. It is namely
known that certain mechanisms aimed at promoting cooper-
ative behavior, like for example punishment [47], elevate the
level of cooperation but at the same time fail to raise the av-
erage payoff accordingly due to the entailed negative payoff
elements. As illustrated in Fig. 1(b), however, this is not the
case at present since larger values of fC readily translate to
larger average payoffs of the population.
In the light of these results, we focus solely on the fraction
of cooperators and show in Fig. 2 how fC varies in depen-
dence on ρ and ∆ at a given temptation value T . Presented re-
sults indicate that what we have observed in Fig. 1(a), namely
the larger the value of ∆ the better, actually holds irrespec-
tive of the value of ρ. More to the point, larger ρ values sup-
port cooperation stronger, which corroborates the argument
that the more heterogeneous the multigame environment the
better. Results presented in Fig. 2 also suggest that it is better
to have many players using higher S values, regardless of the
fact that the price is an equal number of players in the popula-
tion using equally high but negative S values. These observa-
tions hold irrespective of the temptation T , and they fit well to
the established notion that heterogeneity, regardless of its ori-
gin, promotes cooperation by enhancing network reciprocity
[35, 48–57].
To support these arguments and to pinpoint the microscopic
mechanism that is responsible for the promotion of coopera-
tion in the multigame environment, we first monitor the frac-
tion of cooperators within subgroups of players that use dif-
ferent payoff matrices. For clarity, we use ρ = 1, where
only two subpopulations exist (players use either S = +∆
or S = −∆, but nobody uses S = 0), and where the posi-
tive effect on the evolution of cooperation is the strongest (see
Fig. 2). Accordingly, one group is formed by players who
use S = +∆, and the other is formed by players who use
S = −∆. We denote the fraction of cooperators in these two
subpopulations by fC+ and fC− , respectively. As Fig. 3(a)
shows, even if only a moderate∆ value is applied, the cooper-
ation level among players who use a positive S value is signif-
icantly higher than among those who use a negative S value.
Unexpectedly, even among those players who effectively play
a traditional prisoner’s dilemma (T > R > P > S), the level
of cooperation is still much higher than the level of cooper-
ation that is supported solely by network reciprocity (with-
out multigame heterogeneity) in the weak prisoner’s dilemma
(T > R > P = S). This fact further supports the conclu-
sion that the introduction of heterogeneity through the multi-
game environment involves the emergence of strong cooper-
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Evolution of cooperation in the multigame
environment on the square lattice, as obtained in dependence on ρ
and ∆. The color map encodes the stationary fraction of cooperators
fC . It can be observed that the dependence of fC on both ρ and
∆ is monotonous, and that it is thus beneficial for the population to
be in the most heterogeneous state possible. Depicted results were
obtained for T = 1.1, but qualitatively equal evolutionary outcomes
can be observers also for other values of T .
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Top panel depicts the level of cooperation in
the two subpopulations on the square lattice, where fC+ denotes the
fraction of cooperators among those who use S = +∆, while fC
−
denotes the fraction of cooperators in the group where S = −∆ is
used. For reference, we also plot the cooperation level in the corre-
sponding homogeneous population, where every player uses S = 0.
Expectedly, the level of cooperation is largest in the subpopulation
where players use S = +∆. Much more surprisingly, however, the
level of cooperation in the subpopulation where players use S = −∆
still significantly exceeds the baseline outcome of the homogeneous
weak prisoner’s dilemma game. Bottom panel depicts the difference
between the level of cooperation in the homogeneous and the hetero-
geneous multigame environment ∆fC , along with the difference in
the strategy invasion flow ∆γ between the two “+” and “-” subpop-
ulations (see main text for details). These results were obtained with
ρ = 1 and ∆ = 0.2, but remain qualitatively identical also for other
parameter values.
ative leaders, which further aid and invigorate traditional net-
work reciprocity. Unlike defectors, cooperators benefit from
a positive feedback effect, which originates in the subpopula-
tion that uses positive S values and then spreads towards the
subpopulation that uses negative S values, ultimately giving
rise to an overall higher social welfare (see Fig. 1(b)).
This explanation can be verified directly by monitoring the
information exchange between the two subpopulations. More
precisely, we measure the frequency of strategy imitations be-
tween players belonging to the two different subpopulations.
The difference ∆γ is positive when players belonging to the
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Evolution of cooperation in the multigame
environment on the scale-free network with degree-normalized pay-
offs. Depicted results were obtained when only 2% of the hubs (high-
degree players) used S = +∆, while the rest of the population used
a moderately negative S value (see main text for details). As on the
square lattice (see top panel of Fig. 1), larger values of∆ (see legend)
allow cooperators to survive at larger values of T .
“-” subpopulation adopt the strategy from players belonging
to the “+” subpopulation more frequently than vice versa. Re-
sults presented in Fig. 3(b) demonstrate clearly that the level
of cooperation is increased only if there is significant asymme-
try in the strategy imitation flow in favor of the “+” subpopula-
tion. Such symmetry breaking, which is due to the multigame
environment, supports a level of cooperation in the homoge-
neous weak prisoner’s dilemma that notably exceeds the level
of cooperation that is supported solely by traditional network
reciprocity.
We proceed by testing the robustness of our observations
and expanding this study to heterogeneous interaction net-
works. First, we consider the Baraba´si-Albert scale-free net-
work [43], where influential players are a priori present due to
the heterogeneity of the topology. Previous research, however,
has shown that the positive impact of degree heterogeneity
vanishes if payoffs are normalized with the degree of play-
ers, as to account for the elevated costs of participating in
many games [58–61]. We therefore apply degree-normalized
payoffs to do away with cooperation promotion that would
be due solely to the heterogeneity of the topology. Further-
more, by striving to keep the average over all payoff matrices
equal to the weak prisoner’s dilemma, it is important to note
that the heterogeneous interaction topology allows us to intro-
duce only a few strongly connected players into the S = +∆
subpopulation, while the rest can use only a moderately neg-
ative S value. Specifically, we assigned S1 = +∆ to only
2% of the hubs, while the rest used S2 = −0.0204 · S1 to
fulfill 0.02 · S1 + 0.98 · S2 = 0 (average over all S in the
population equal to zero to yield, on average, the weak pris-
oner’s dilemma payoff ranking). As results depicted in Fig. 4
show, even with this relatively minor modification that intro-
duces the multigame environment, the promotion of coopera-
tion is significant if only ∆ is sufficiently large (see legend).
Evidently, ∆ = 0 returns the modest cooperation level that
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Evolution of cooperation in the time-varying
multigame environment on the square lattice. Depicted results were
obtained when players could choose between S = +∆ and S = −∆
with equal probability at each instance of the game (see legend for
the applied ∆ values). As on the square lattice with time invariable
subpopulations (see top panel of Fig. 1), larger values of ∆ allow
cooperators to survive at larger values of T , although in this case the
positive impact on the evolution of cooperation is less strong.
has been reported before on scale-free networks with degree-
normalized payoffs, but for ∆ = 0.8 the coexistence of co-
operators and defectors is possible almost across the whole
interval of T . It is also important to note that the positive ef-
fect could be easily amplified further simply by introducing
more players into the S = +∆ subpopulation and letting the
remainder use an accordingly even less negative values of S.
These results indicate that the topology of the interaction net-
work has only secondary importance, because the heterogene-
ity that is introduced by payoff differences already provides
the necessary support for the successful evolution of coop-
eration. Consequently, in the realm of the introduced multi-
game environment, we have observed qualitatively identical
cooperation-supporting effects when using the random regu-
lar graph or the configurational model of Bender and Canfield
[62–64] for generating the interaction network.
Lastly, we present results obtained within a time-varying
multigame environment to further corroborate the robustness
of our main arguments. Several examples could be provided
as to why players’ perception might change over time. The
key point is that players may still perceive the same dilemma
situation differently, and hence they may use different pay-
off matrices. Our primary goal here is to present the results
obtained with a minimal model, although extensions towards
more sophisticated and realistic models are of course possible.
Accordingly, unlike considered thus far, players do not have a
permanently assigned S value, but rather, they can choose be-
tween S = +∆ and S = −∆ with equal probability at each
instance of the game. Naturally, this again returns the S = 0
weak prisoner’s dilemma on average over time, and as shown
in [40], in well-mixed populations returns the complete defec-
tion stationary state. In structured populations, however, for
∆ > 0, we can again observe promotion of cooperation be-
yond the level that is warranted solely by network reciprocity.
For simplicity, results presented in Fig. 5 were obtained by
using the square lattice as the underlying interaction network,
but in agreement with the results presented in Fig. 4, quali-
tatively identical evolutionary outcomes are obtained also on
heterogeneous interaction networks. Comparing to the re-
sults presented in Fig. 1(a), where the time invariable multi-
game environment was applied, we conclude that in the time-
varying multigame environment the promotion of cooperation
is less strong. This, however, is understandable, since the
cooperation-supporting influential players emerge only for a
short period of time, but on average the overall positive effect
in the stationary state is still clearly there. To conclude, it is
worth pointing out that time-dependent perceptions of social
dilemmas open the path towards coevolutionary models, as
studied previously in the realm of evolutionary games [34, 65–
69], and they also invite the consideration of the importance
of time scales [70] in evolutionary multigames.
IV. DISCUSSION
We have studied multigames in structured populations un-
der the assumption that the same social dilemma is often per-
ceived differently by competing players, and that thus they
may use different payoff matrices when interacting with their
opponents. This essentially introduces heterogeneity to the
evolutionary game and aids network reciprocity in sustaining
cooperative behavior even under adverse conditions. As the
core game and the baseline for comparisons, we have consid-
ered the weak prisoner’s dilemma, while the multigame envi-
ronment has been introduced by assigning to a fraction of the
population either a positive or a negative value of the sucker’s
payoff. We have shown that, regardless of the structure of
the interaction network, and also irrespective of whether the
multigame environment is time invariant or not, the evolution
of cooperation is promoted the more the larger the heterogene-
ity in the population. As the responsible microscopic mecha-
nism behind the enhanced level of cooperation, we have iden-
tified an asymmetric strategy imitation flow from the subpop-
ulation adopting positive sucker’s payoffs to the population
adopting negative sucker’s payoffs. Since the subpopulation
where players use positive sucker’s payoffs expectedly fea-
tures a higher level of cooperation, the asymmetric strategy
imitation flow thus acts in favor of cooperative behavior also
in the other subpopulations, and ultimately it raises the overall
level of social welfare in the population.
The obtained results in structured populations are in con-
trast to the results obtained in well-mixed populations, where
simply the baseline weak prisoner’s dilemma is recovered re-
gardless of multigame parametrization. Although it is ex-
pected that structured populations support evolutionary out-
comes that are different from the mean-field case [31, 32, 34,
36], the importance of this fact for multigames is of particular
relevance since interactions among players are frequently not
best described by a well-mixed model, but rather they are lim-
ited to a set of other players in the population and as such are
best described by a network. Put differently, although some-
times analytically solvable, the well-mixed models can at best
6support proof-of-principle studies, but otherwise have limited
applicability for realistic systems.
Taken together, the presented results add to the existing evi-
dence in favor of heterogeneity-enhanced network reciprocity,
and they further establish heterogeneity among players as a
strong fundamental feature that can elevate the cooperation
level in structured populations past the boundaries that are im-
posed by traditional network reciprocity. The rather surprising
role of different perceptions of the same conflict thus reveals
itself as a powerful mechanism for resolving social dilemmas,
although it is rooted in the same fundamental principles as
other mechanisms for cooperation promotion that rely on het-
erogeneity. We hope this paper will motivate further research
on multigames in structured populations, which appears to be
an underexplored subject with many relevant implications.
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